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Learning from Twentieth Century Hermeneutic Phenomenology for the 
Human Sciences and Practical Disciplines 
 





The implications of commonalities in the contributions of five key thinkers in twentieth century 
phenomenology are discussed in relation to both original aims and contemporary projects. It is 
argued that, contrary to the claims of Husserl, phenomenology can only operate as hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Hermeneutics arose within German idealism. It began with Friedrich Ast and 
Heinrich Schleiermacher and was further developed by, among others, Wilhelm Dilthey and 
Martin Heidegger. Hermeneutics claims that current understanding is created on the basis of the 
prior understanding taken to any new situation, in that what is initially understood or believed 
determines the direction and scope for inquiry or action. Subsequent action and conclustions are 
similarly based on what has been previously understood and believed. As a consequence, 
however, what may, in some cases, result is the confirmation of prior inaccurate understanding. 
For these reasons, it is important to be clear about how initial understandings are formed and 
how they inform a discipline, be it the Husserlian phenomenology of intentionality or any 






The introductory section of this paper provides an 
overview of the argument elaborated in the remainder 
of the paper. Proceeding from the question about the 
extent to which research of any kind, including 
phenomenology in any of its various forms, can be 
presuppositionless, it questions the claim that 
transcendental phenomenology has the ability to 
overcome the “vicious circle” which Husserl (1911/ 
1981a, p. 172) contended made it impossible for 
natural science, with its empirically relativistic 
assumption that only experimentalism enables the 
truth about any matter to emerge, to contribute to 
grounding itself.  
 
Husserl’s phenomenology was essentially theoretical 
and originally conceived both to locate philosophy as 
a “rigorous science” and to overcome the problems of 
an excessive zeal for empiricism (1911/1981a). 
Between the years 1925 to 1929 at least, Husserl was 
clear that there were two versions of phenomenology. 
Both were “a priori”, theoretical or philosophical 
clarifications of experience. Phenomenological pure 
psychology is a way of understanding how 
consciousness works in its social context to create 
meaning. Taking the world and people in it to be real, 
it defines how mental processes work together to 
produce specific types of meaning. 
 
Transcendental phenomenology, on the other hand, is 
a more abstract version of exploring meaning for any 
consciousness in any social context.  For Husserl, it is 
not necessarily tied to the limitation of understanding 
this world (Husserl, 1931/1977a, 1962/1977b, 
1968/1997a, 1968/1997b). The original forms of 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 1   May 2008  Page 2 of 12 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
phenomenology were theoretical endeavours in the 
way that pure mathematics supports the applied 
sciences. While a pure psychology supports all real 
world science and academia, transcendental 
phenomenology supports philosophy. Both of 
Husserl’s studies are theory-building for later 
empiricism through understanding consciousness. 
Whether in its real world psychological form or the 
transcendental study of meaning in a public world, the 
phenomenology of the intentionality of consciousness 
aims to determine the invariant structure of conscious 
experience (1973/1999). 
 
For Husserl, the dream was never over that 
transcendental phenomenology and its practitioners or 
“non-participating onlookers” can conclude on 
consciousness and how it works (1956/1970, pp. 391-
394). Husserl’s methods involve working on the raw 
data of the many co-occurring types of conscious 
experiences, in order to conclude on the nature of the 
forms of intentionality that are creative of them 
(Marbach, 1992, 1993, 2005). The implication is that 
all of life occurs through various types of awareness 
about objects that produce different senses of them 
that can be grasped in various contexts – irrespective 
of whether those contexts are interpretive ones of 
understanding, or whether they be perceptual or 
psychological contexts. Proper explanation in practice 
and theory concerns making explicit in terms of 
intentionalities how, for instance, a memory 
experientially co-occurs in the perceptual present. 
Husserl asserted that his phenomenology would 
ground the sciences through mental clarification of 
the nature of the intentionalities in relation to various 
aspects of attention. This is the key to making 
empirical applications of ideas hit their target. For 
instance, it was Darwin who observed animals and 
then theorised about heritability and selection. It takes 
contemporary DNA research to prove him right or 
wrong. It was Einstein who imagined what it was like 
to travel at the speed of light in order to make his 
mathematical statements. It took twentieth century 
physics to explore his claims. 
 
However, Jaspers, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and 
Ricoeur did not agree with the claim that 
transcendental phenomenology could overthrow the 
hermeneutic circle between “the aim-providing 
problems as of its methods”, given the existence even 
in phenomenology of “a certain logical harmony 
between the guiding problems ... and precisely such 
foundations and methods” (Husserl, 1911/1981a, p. 
189). This can be read precisely as a warning to deal 
with the blindspot of the circular influence of 
previous understanding. In agreement with these 
writers, this paper argues that any inquiry or science 
is inevitably hermeneutic in the sense that it makes 
sense and should be self-reflexive in understanding 
what it takes to its subject matter. It urges 
contemporary workers in empirical phenomenology 
and psychology to take heed of what the hermeneutic 
circle means: there are no unprejudiced views. Prior 
views influence, and maybe even create, what is 
found by means of their modes of attention to the 
object of study. If the proposition of the hermeneutic 
circle is accepted, what is implied is that it is 
impossible to eradicate the influence of the past on 
present understanding. This is particularly 
problematic when it comes to making conclusions in 
empirical phenomenology, qualitative or quantitative 
psychology, and other types of empirical research. 
 
In order to show that these claims are justified, it is 
necessary to side-step some entrenched mis-
understandings about phenomenology. Here no 
criticism is made of empirical phenomenology 
following the influence of Gurwitsch, Cairns, Giorgi, 
Wertz, Embree and others. However, the thrust of all 
of these can be classified as object-oriented empirical 
phenomenology. An exclusive focus on the sense of 
objects was never Husserl’s project in his exploring 
of links between the forms of intentionality, the 
senses obtained about specific objects of attention, 
and understanding how these exist in contexts or 
horizons (Husserl, 1913/1982, §§130-132, 150-151; 
1980/2005; Marbach, 1992). Consequently, therefore, 
phenomenology was never merely the description of 
the senses of objects as an end in itself. For Husserl, 
the primary focus on intentionality was impeded 
because “the phenomenological method ... only leads 
us first into a new naïveté, that of simple descriptive 
act analysis” that he sometimes called “noetic 
phenomenology”, “noetics”, “intentional analysis”, 
“intentional psychology”, “elucidation” or 
“explication”, Auslegung (stated by Husserl in August 
1931: Cairns, 1976, p. 27). The original phenomeno-
logy is the elucidation of connections between 
intentionalities, senses, objects and contexts, as was 
indicated by Husserl’s remarks about making “an 
uncovering ... an explication ... of what is consciously 
meant (the objective sense) and correlatively, an 
explication of the potential intentional processes 
themselves” (Husserl, 1931/ 1977, §20, p. 46). For 
this paper, it is precisely this movement from what 
appears, “the objective sense”, to the conclusions 
concerning what is ‘invisible’, the “intentional 
processes themselves”, that demands a specific type 
of hermeneutics of how to make such interpretative 
conclusions. To spell this out once more: what 
Husserl claimed was that the applied sciences should 
understand how consciousness works in concept-
making and arguing in relation to the conscious 
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experiences that occur in their social contexts, in 
order to justify their claims (1962/1977, §45). 
Husserlian conclusions are of the sort reported by 
Marbach (1993, 2005). They concern how all simple 
and compound types of mental acts exist and connect, 
one with the others.  
The hermeneutic circle is particularly pertinent to 
Husserlian phenomenology. Because intentionalities 
do not appear, not even to first-person conscious 
experience, they can only ever be interpreted. The 
end-products of the senses of objects appear, but that 
is the result of the work done by one consciousness in 
connection with other consciousnesses. It would thus 
have been better for Husserl to have conceded that 
what is understood occurs because of contexts of 
understanding and interpretation that provide specific 
senses. But that would be contrary to his claims that it 
is possible for transcendental phenomenology to 
escape the influence of the hermeneutic circle. 
 
Accordingly, in agreement with Jaspers, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, it is contended that the 
original phenomenology is the interpretation of the 
forms of intentionality and that this demands 
hermeneutics. Following the conclusions of Kern, 
Marbach, Ströker and Zahavi, who are accepted as 
being the leading writers in the field of Husserlian 
phenomenology, the contribution of this paper is to 
emphasise that what appears in conscious experience 
are the many types of the “How of its modes of 
givenness” (Husserl, 1913/1982, §132, p. 316). The 
modes of givenness – as spoken about, remembered, 
heard – are compared and contrasted to interpret 
concepts that define precisely how a memory 
reappears in current perception, for instance, or in 
order to understand how looking at a painting differs 
from reading the written word. The aim is to 
understand how intentionality enables these things to 
make their publicly-accessible meanings. A more 
complex example in psychology is when participants 
fill in a questionnaire, where it is the totality of their 
previous understanding that enables them to rate 
themselves and provide answers to the questions. It is 
also the totality of prior experience that enables the 
questionnaire to make sense and provides for 
psychologists then to allocate numerical scores to the 
answers supplied.  
 
The most general case of the problem of the 
hermeneutic circle for science and academic inquiry 
is that the current object is understood on the basis of 
the old, to such a degree that past learning can 
obscure the current object. The hermeneutic circle is 
the “to-and-fro movement ... between interpreting 
individual phenomena and interpreting the whole” 
that “is characteristic of all interpretation” (Rickman, 
2004, p. 73). In general, the phenomenon of 
understanding includes what could be called bias, 
prejudice or inability to attend to the current object. 
  
The upshot for qualitative psychology, for instance, is 
a failure to grasp the phenomena of its participants as 
they experience them, because pre-existing theory 
mis-directs the researchers away from the 
phenomena. For qualitative psychology, a psycho-
logical hermeneutics would be a formal study of the 
role of previous understanding that is taken to the 
current phenomena, in such a way as to create 
findings in the light of previous understanding. This is 
observable in psychology, where each school has its 
own viewpoint that serves as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The earlier understanding corrupts and 
excludes new, potentially relevant information. 
Metaphorically, what is being referred to is that any 
school of academic inquiry, theoretical or empirical, 
‘pulls itself up by its own pig tail’. For instance, 
evolutionary psychology insists that current 
experience is dominated by genetic function and 
success in reproduction. It argues that current events 
are the result of competition whereby the most 
effective functioning always wins, and evolution is 
what primarily shapes human behaviour. On the other 
hand, discourse analysis, for instance, believes that 
dominant discourses are most causative, so that what 
are believed to be socially acceptable ways of 
discussing a topic are most formative of human 
behaviour. But, in empirical psychology generally, 
psychologism holds: Only experiments can determine 
what is true or not and it is hubris to believe 
otherwise. Psychologism is thus one of the problems 
that phenomenology was invented to oppose. 
 
Let us take the claim of the ubiquity of the 
hermeneutic circle to Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology in order to show how it is relevant. 
Husserl’s dream is that it is possible to determine the 
true nature of consciousness by attending to the 
phenomena that appear in conscious experiences 
without hermeneutics and differences in viewpoint 
misleading the results. He claimed that transcendental 
phenomenology can get outside of the hermeneutic 
circle. But because Husserl held the position called 
transcendental idealism that “it is nonsense to speak 
of a fundamentally unknowable being that still lies 
beyond these ultimates ... [because what counts is] the 
“constitution” of being in consciousness, along with 
the related problems of being” (Husserl’s letter to 
Dilthey of 5 July, 1911, 1968/1981b, p. 207), it is not 
clear how he overcame the circularity within his own 
practice and theory. Husserl also stated the following 
in one sentence which is the opposite of what 
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Heidegger contended: “All experiential knowledge of 
life is restricted by the particular respective life-
practice, which predelineates how far the 
determinacies are to be determined in advance; 
theoretical interest and science are practically 
uninterested and thereby unlimitedly all-inclusive in 
their focus” (1962/1977, §45, p. 172). Husserl’s 
object was to understand consciousness generally, and 
his method involved elucidating his own 
consciousness and imagining the experiences of other 
persons (Husserl, 1973, cited in Marbach, 1982). His 
methods conclude on theory about the nature of 
consciousness by thought experiments on the 
universal nature of consciousness (Husserl, 
1913/1982, §47; 1968/1997a, §4, p. 165, §8, p. 171; 
1968/1997b, §8, pp. 231-232, §11, pp. 240-241; 
1931/1977, §34, p. 72, §41, pp. 84-85). There are 
major problems in using a technique of imaginative 
variation to conclude on theory. The limits of 
consciousness, hermeneutics and life experience are 
constraints:  
 
1. There is the inability to have the experiences 
and perspectives of others as they have them. 
 
2. There is great difficulty in remembering 
one’s own childhood or understanding the 
experiences of infants (as per 1). 
 
3. The ability to imagine another’s experiences 
is limited according to the breadth of one’s 
own social and cultural experiences. 
 
4. There is difficulty knowing what sort of 
human experience to include and hence how 
to capture the whole of a region in relation to 
its greater wholes. Relevant in this regard is 
the fact that Husserl classed phenomenology 
as a theory-making procedure and not as an 
empirical one. 
 
Very pertinently for Husserlian phenomenology, there 
is confusion between aims and methods, particularly 
when there is a claim to be presuppositionless. 
Husserl stated a laudable and self-reflexive ideal 
when he wrote that “The true method follows the 
nature of the things to be investigated and not our 
prejudices and preconceptions” (1911/1981a, p. 179). 
But the problem is precisely – how it is possible to 
remove the influence of the past and invisible guiding 
assumptions, and occupy a position of no bias 
towards the meaningful phenomena of consciousness? 
This leaves an unanswered question in his work 
concerning the self-understanding of the 
transcendental phenomenologist or “non-participating 
onlooker” who “does not have to assert any realities 
and possibilities with respect to the actual and quasi-
data belonging to the Ego underneath. What he asserts 
in this respect are ‘realities’ and ‘possibilities’ in 
quotation marks” (1980/2005, text 20, p. 697, fn. 13). 
What this last citation means is that the method of 
thought experiments about what is merely possible 
concerning any consciousness in any world was 
allegedly sufficient to reason about what is universal 
and what must be the case for all consciousness. To 
reiterate Husserl's claim, transcendental phenomeno-
logy takes the “‘psychical’, which appears in the 
natural attitude, and in positively oriented 
psychology, as a dependent stratum of being in 
humans and animals, [and] thereby loses even the 
sense of a mundanely phenomenal event” (Bernet, 
Kern & Marbach, 1993, p 74). This is claiming that 
the transcendental reduction removes consciousness 
from the wrong interpretation of it as a part of the 
materialistic world, with all the mis-understandings of 
the natural or everyday understandings of common 
sense. He claimed that the transcendental reduction 
and other methods freed consciousness for unbiased 
inspection. It is not clear how this can be done 
through the imagination alone, and that is one reason 
why Husserl has had so many critics. 
 
In line with hermeneutic phenomenology, this paper 
takes issue with Husserl and demands an encounter 
with hermeneutics. It is argued that, in order to 
conclude on the nature of the intentionalities, 
hermeneutics and phenomenology should sit together. 
There should be a self-reflexive understanding of 
what is assumed with regard to what is being 
emphasised as important and relevant – as opposed to 
what is not. Theories are not about everything. They 
highlight specific aspects of what appears and relate it 
to other relevant aspects and let some matters recede 
into the background. Two key questions are: to what 
extent is it possible to break free of false 
assumptions? – and to what extent is it possible to 
conclude in language on the truth of the phenomena 
of consciousness?  
 
Agreeing with hermeneutics means that it is 
impossible to have a school of ‘no obstructions’. 
Paradoxically, to believe that one has attained no 
obstructions is to be blinded both to them and to the 
blindness of one’s own bias. This is why Jaspers, 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur disagreed 
with Husserl. As Merleau-Ponty put it: “The most 
important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the 
impossibility of a complete reduction” (1945/1962, p. 
xiv). To accept the role of hermeneutics is to agree 
that it is possible to create schools of research that are 
self-reflexive in understanding how they draw their 
conclusions. This is accounting for one’s own 
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perspective in terms of how meaning and cause are 
concluded on, for instance. The role of hermeneutics 
is academic theoretical discourse oriented towards the 
aim of self-reflexivity. 
 
Husserl’s Positive Legacy 
 
Now that the argument of this paper has been outlined 
in full, the purpose of the remainder of the paper is to 
provide more evidence for its key claims. The current 
section comments on certain aspects of Husserl’s 
claims and considers the implications of some key 
passages from his writing. The following section 
notes how the phenomenological movement 
developed towards hermeneutics and meaning, away 
from the original claim to be presuppositionless and 
to have overcome the hermeneutic and other circles. 
In the third section, in support of the link between 
phenomenology and hermeneutics, commonalities 
seen across a number of twentieth century 
hermeneutic phenomenologists are stated in relation 
to psychology. A short number of general conclusions 
are stated for the human sciences in the main, 
although they also apply to other areas. 
 
It is well known that Husserl has had an influence in a 
number of academic areas. But no other persons have 
followed his methods and ideas to the letter in their 
development of his work. Not even the closest 
interpreters like Kern, Marbach, Ströker and Zahavi 
have published work that shows the details of the 
thought experiments that clarify the intentionalities. 
This omission implies criticism. Below, thumbnail 
sketches of a selection of twentieth century writers 
are provided in support of the assertion that 
phenomenology can only exist as a hermeneutic and 
explicitly self-reflexive approach. What this means is 
that a sufficient understanding needs to be taken to a 
phenomenon in order to reveal it properly. The 
opposite effect is also noticeable. Poor or downright 
wrong understanding can be applied – that obscures 
and mis-represents – so leading knowledge and 
practices away from their aims and objects. 
 
Husserl set the scene for a more radical turn to 
experience than Kant by noting that belief is close to 
perception and other forms of the givenness of 
meanings of different sorts (1973/1999, p. 61; 
1913/1982, §135, p. 325). Drawing conclusions in 
language about what is heard, seen and felt requires 
intellectual work with respect to conscious 
experience. Any assertions about cause, motives for 
action and what motivates others in truth must arise 
from the best possible evidence for such assertions. 
Indeed, Husserl’s definition of reason concerned 
decreasing partial givenness, or “empty” conceptual 
givenness, in order to gain fulfilled experiences 
themselves and become able to make proper 
conclusions (§145, p. 344). Even abstract relations 
were decided by having fulfilled experiences. For 
instance, the term “transcendental aesthetics” in 
Husserl means linking the form of the ego to the 
other, the communal and temporality in seeing the 
necessary enabling conditions for space, time and 
cause to exist (1931/1977, §61, p. 146). This is 
“seeing” the evidence of spaciality, temporality and 
causality as they apply to the sense of self in 
connection with others: in that personal being 
concerns the sense of the lived body as the central 
point on which each self looks out onto the world. 
 
For Husserl, reason is striving towards better 
evidence and moving away from lesser types (1913/ 
1982, §138, pp. 332-333, §151, p. 364). What Husserl 
argued was that consciousness functions to create the 
world of meaning for people. The possibility of a 
world of shared meaning demands, as a condition for 
its existence, that consciousness exist. If there is no 
consciousness, there is no world of meaning (ibid., 
§49). Accordingly, intellectual meaning and non-
verbal meaning co-occur. Specific meaningful objects 
appear through, or across, manifold senses. Each 
sense has its own perspective and context. The 
modalities of belief are the types of believing that 
comprise ‘the family of belief’ as a whole. Some 
members of the family of belief are certainty, 
possibility, doubtfulness and certitude. These 
modalities create objects of attention that are 
experienced as senses of existence, uncertain 
existence, probable existence, certainty concerning 
the non-existence ... and so on. Different types of 
evidence have different qualities and styles of 
appearing. Husserl’s mature understanding of truth 
was “an idea, lying at infinity’ ... not as falsely 
absolutised, but rather, in each case, as within 
horizons – which do not remain overlooked or veiled 
from sight but are systematically explicated” 
(1929/1969, §105, p. 279). Having laid out some of 
the key passages from Husserl, a few short remarks 





This section sketches the overall nature of 
hermeneutics via some brief sketches of the early 
contributors. It was Friedrich Ast who seems to have 
been the first person to formulate the basic 
proposition that later became known as the 
hermeneutic circle (Palmer, 1969, p. 77). This basic 
idea was developed by Schleiermacher and Dilthey. 
What all later hermeneutists share is the development 
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of Ast’s original idea. Heinrich Schleiermacher stated 
the circularity in the following way: how things make 
sense is that we compare the new to what we already 
know (p. 87). Schleiermacher developed the idea that 
the part and the whole interact to make sense. For 
him, the part and the whole determine each other: He 
called the overall effect the hermeneutic circle. 
Understanding is circular because there is a back and 
forth movement between the whole that defines its 
parts and the parts that contribute to the whole. 
Depending on the scope taken, there are greater 
wholes and lesser parts. 
 
Wilhelm Dilthey developed hermeneutics in the 
direction of a general theory of understanding. He 
distinguished between elementary understanding, 
which is fundamental and common, and higher forms 
of understanding of communication of various sorts, 
with the former enabling the latter (Dilthey, 1976, pp. 
218-225). For instance, empathy with historical 
characters and situations is necessary to understand 
the historical context in which they were living. Only 
on that basis can there be accurate readings of history. 
To situate a specific text in its genre occurs through 
reading the genre. In contemporary English language 
circles, Hans Peter Rickman (2004) has done a great 
deal to explain and build on the connections between 
Kant and Dilthey. Summing up the hermeneutic 
circle, Rickman asserts that moving “between 
interpreting individual phenomena and interpreting 
the whole of which they are supposed to form part is 
characteristic of all interpretation … . There is … no 
absolute starting point, no rigid framework of 
assumptions on which an interpretative theory can 
rest ... . Interpretation … is a matter of getting at the 
meaning of human phenomena … of discovering 
from their expressions what people think, feel, and 
want” (p. 73). 
 
Martin Heidegger’s approach became popular 
because he took Husserl’s attention to lived 
experiences, and, in creating his “fundamental 
ontology”, he indicated that the path for philosophy 
was to put its house in order by basing its claims 
about what exists or not on the most fundamental and 
all-encompassing direct experience of existence and 
non-existence (1927/1996, §§3-6). The significance 
of this is that each academic discipline sets its course 
by identifying a region of genuinely existing objects 
towards which it is devoted. The prior understanding 
is that a region and its objects genuinely exist in an 
implicit way, pre-reflexively (§69b, p. 328), because 
of temporality (§69c), in the sense that temporality is 
the most important aspect of being of human being in 
that the past, the present and the future co-exist. In 
Heidegger’s terminology, once a fundamental 
ontology has been established, it would then be 
possible to ground regional ontologies (academic 
disciplines concerning parts of the world and regions 
of objects) on direct experience, properly interpreted 
“in the right way” (§33, p. 143). By this he meant that 
there should be an a priori intellectual analysis of 
human being as temporal, in relation to its 
situatedness in terms of its contexts, practical action, 
its social habit, the role of language, its mortality, in 
relation to its conscience, in occupying physical 
space, and its other characteristics, including its 
ability to not know itself.  
 
Husserl never acknowledged the relevance of 
hermeneutics in his published writing, although he 
did acknowledge a debt of inspiration to Dilthey. 
Husserl responded to Dilthey and replied to the 
hermeneutic tradition as a whole (1968/1981b, 1962/ 
1977, §§1, 2, 3d). Husserl worked to identify parts of 
the whole. He insisted that basic understanding is 
drawn through seeing evidence for oneself, a type of 
experiential learning. However, there is a great deal 
of meaning that is simply just not present as a fact. 
The problem with urging people to observe 
phenomena is that any group of reasonable people 
will see different meanings in what appears to them. 
This is why it is necessary to have some account of 
how meaning is co-created – particularly when the 
aim is to account for the conditions of the possibility 
of meaning for more than one person.  
 
The background themes now being in place, the paper 
proceeds to provide some thumbnail sketches of five 
key thinkers who concluded either that hermeneutics 
and phenomenology co-exist or that meaning should 
be addressed in a holistic way. 
 
The Hermeneutic Commonality within the History 
of Phenomenology 
 
This section refers to those who critiqued Husserl and 
developed his ideas. The French readings of Husserl 
and Heidegger were mixed with other aspects of 
politics, philosophy, psycho-analysis and Gestalt 
psychology to produce the expanded view called 
existential phenomenology. Only a few comments 
will be made on the positive lead set by Heidegger in 
regard to uniting hermeneutics and phenomenology. 
Then some brief characterisations of Sartre and de 
Beauvoir are provided to show their attention to 
meaning. 
 
Despite Heidegger’s ironic introductory comments 
that philosophers should be guided by how things 
show themselves (1927/1996, §7c, p. 30) and that 
hermeneutics should be used to attend to non-verbal 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 1   May 2008  Page 7 of 12 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
meaning (§§32, 33), he later stated that the circle is an 
insufficient figure for understanding (§63, p. 291). 
What Heidegger was referring to was his view that 
temporality is the most fundamental way of 
understanding human being. Temporality connects 
with history as the proper universe of all forms of 
understanding and of being self-reflexively cognisant 
of those ways of understanding. His comments on the 
relation between theory and reality (§69b, pp. 327-
328) are also subordinate to the grasping of the 
temporality of human being. This could be read as 
overthrowing Schleiermacher’s idea of circularity 
between the past and the present. Heidegger’s view is 
of the interrelation between past, future and present.  
 
Heidegger stated his position in the abstract and it 
applies to understanding and interpreting. In practice, 
it concerns identifying how anticipation is shaped by 
the past and future – be it for a school of research or 
an individual person. Basic Problems makes it clear: 
“If we did not understand, even though at first 
roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what 
actually signifies, then the actual would remain 
hidden from us. If we did not understand what reality 
means, then the real would remain inaccessible. If we 
did not understand what life and vitality signify, then 
we would not be able to comport ourselves toward 
living beings” (1975/1982, §2, p. 10). What he was 
arguing for was a turn towards understanding human 
being through a “hermeneutic of the facticity of Da-
sein in general” (1927/1996, p. 401, n. 1), by which 
he meant finding the enabling conditions for being in 
a world through argument concerning everyday 
experience: like using a hammer (§33, p. 145), under-
standing road signs (§17, p. 74), or understanding the 
weather to see if it will rain or not (§17, p. 75). 
 
However, let us turn to the case of understanding 
people. There is the shared attention to imagining the 
experiences of other persons in Husserl (1973, cited 
in Marbach, 1982) and Karl Jaspers (1913/1963; 
Wiggins and Schwartz, 1997). Jaspers well 
understood the hermeneutic circle and exemplified it 
in his approach to psychopathology (1913/1963, pp. 
355-359). Such an attention to the experiences of 
others is of use in meeting with people in that it 
enables one to understand as well as possible what 
they are talking about. It is also of use in trying to 
understand psychopathology generally. Jaspers 
independently came to the same conclusion as 
Husserl. In order to understand other persons, it is 
necessary to imagine, empathise and interpret what 
their experiences actually are for them (p. 326). 
Cultural anthropology calls this an “emic” approach. 
It means understanding others through immersing 
oneself in what they might be experiencing. Key 
portions of the General Psychopathology recapitulate 
the nature of hermeneutics. Jaspers commented that 
the “totality of human life and its ultimate origin 
cannot be the object of any scientific research” (p. 
543). In short, a number of holistic and hermeneutic 
aspects are evident. Among these are the ideas that  
meaning is open and forever capable of re-
interpretation (p. 356); the meaningful whole 
comprises each of its dependent pieces (p. 357);  
understanding and certainty can increase (p. 358) and 
so rationality does exist; it is not unphenomenological 
or unhermeneutic to argue for a conclusion.  
  
Paul Ricoeur (1975) was another who argued for an 
attendance to conscious meanings and the need for 
formal ways of making sense of what appears. 
Ricoeur concluded that hermeneutics is necessary for 
phenomenology to exist. What this means is that the 
territory of meaning is a region for natural empirical 
science. For Ricoeur, phenomenology is the 
“indispensable presupposition” of hermeneutics 
(1975, p. 85). He thus argued that both disciplines 
stand together. Ricoeur picked Husserl’s definition of 
the explication of the link between intentionalities and 
their objects as the explication of these correlations in 
terms of interpreting the forms of intentionalities in 
play with respect to their objects (Husserl, 1931/1977, 
§41, p. 84). Ricoeur focused on finding intentionality 
in phenomenology because hermeneutics is required 
for making distinctions between all the types of 
givenness: as remembered, as heard, as discussed in 
concepts. Therefore, phenomenology is hermeneutics 
(1975, p. 99). The link between what Ricoeur pointed 
out and what Husserl originally wrote is that 
phenomenology comes into being when “we therefore 
ask quite universally ... what is evidentially ‘inherent’ 
in the whole reduced phenomenon ... its ‘perceived as 
perceived’” (1913/1982, §90, p. 220). The common 
aim is to interpret phenomena properly, according to 
their genuine manner of being, which is how the 
intentionalities and the senses produced overlap and 
intermingle (1962/1977, §3e, p. 26). The problem to 
be overcome is that, if it is unclear how initial 
understanding obscures or represents the phenomena 
in question, then there is no account of how to 
conclude properly in any investigation about it. 
 
The term “existentialism” sometimes refers to the 
work of Jean-Paul Sartre alone and sometimes to 
existential phenomenology as a whole: what I am 
calling the “French readings” of Husserl, Heidegger, 
psychoanalysis and Gestalt. What is concluded by 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/1958) is that holism is 
required for understanding meaning, human nature, 
the consequences of choices that have been made, and 
the intersubjective positions held with respect to self 
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and others. Whilst hermeneutics is not specifically 
mentioned by Sartre, it is very clear that the important 
project is attending to conscious meaning. Sartre 
backed the guiding idea that the conscious needs to be 
followed as a clue in order to reveal the preconscious. 
This interpretative strategy is useful in making sense 
of psychological situations, for instance. Sartre 
realised that being, having and doing co-occur for 
human beings (p. 576). He concluded that holism 
must occur in making sense of the human situation. 
He argued that human existence is a whole, not just a 
series of parts, and that the parts indicate the whole to 
which they belong: “man is a totality and not a 
collection. Consequently he expresses himself as a 
whole in even his most insignificant and his most 
superficial behaviour. In other words, there is a not a 
taste, a mannerism, or a human act that is not 
revealing” (p. 568). Pre-conscious meanings can be 
interpreted by going from the conscious towards that 
which is currently out of consciousness, but the object 
of attention can be retrieved through discussion. He 
called his method existential psychoanalysis: “Its 
point of departure is experience; its pillar of support 
is the fundamental, pre-ontological comprehension 
which man has of the human person ... each human 
individual nevertheless possesses a priori the 
meaning of the revelatory value of these 
manifestations and is capable of deciphering them ... . 
Its method is comparative” (pp. 568-9). These 
comments have wide-ranging implications in terms of 
defining what is achievable in human inquiry. It is 
claimed that Sartre did justice to the complex and 
constructed nature of ordinary living. 
 
Simone de Beauvoir was another who was exemplary 
in taking phenomenology and applying it to human 
development, gender relations and sexuality, for 
instance (1949a, 1949b). She accepted Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s holism and applied a contextual view of the 
intentionality of action to everyday life. For her, 
actions make sense in their context and aim overall. 
The same action thus needs to be understood through 
grasping the attitude and purpose of the specific actor. 
Such an approach is useful in taking theory to the 
individual, in understanding what happens for him or 
her, in any given situation. So it is a prerequisite for 
understanding personality and how specific events 
make sense to others. This holism is common to 
Sartre and  Karl Jaspers as well. 
 
Some Implications for the Human Sciences 
 
To return to the original aim of the paper, it should 
now be clearer how important it is to be self-reflexive 
in making clear to colleagues and ourselves our  own 
personal responsibility in how we make sense of 
situations. This is the concern that creates anxiety 
about re-search methods and the desire for adequate 
justification in various forms of meaning-oriented 
searching again. Another common aspect between 
three of the key thinkers mentioned above is now 
appraised, and that is the role of empathy in donating 
sense to what appears. 
 
Following Dilthey, Husserl and Jaspers, what 
empathy contributes to psychological research is that 
it is the fundamental form of understanding that 
grasps what is observable and recordable. Empathy 
breathes psychological meaning into listening to 
people, observing the non-verbal, reading written 
descriptions, and concluding on what statistics mean. 
Psychological meanings appear only through 
empathic understanding and are themselves incapable 
of being recorded. The terms empathic understanding 
and psychological understanding are identical and are 
part of the greater expanse of commonsense. For 
instance, intentions and the details of the experiences 
of others are indicated through what people say about 
their memories, anticipations and what it is like for 
others to lead their lives. What intentionality means in 
relation to meaningful objects is that it shows how 
people react to meanings that are not apparent to 
others. Stating this point very generally, people react 
to what they anticipate, feel and reason might happen. 
These intentionalities are not hallucination or 
dreaming. Anticipation, emotion and reasoning might 
be in agreement with the views of others about the 
same physical object, in the here and now or not. 
Accordingly, reactions to what is anticipated, valued, 
remembered, felt or reasoned about are the result of 
meaning-making processes. Such ‘causes’ of human 
behaviour evade psychology as natural science. Yet 
these experiences are valid and existent phenomena: 
these ‘intangibles’ are interpreted psychological 
reasons for acting of a completely different sort to the 
natural causes of genetic traits and chemicals in the 
bloodstream. The role of the hermeneutic circle is 
understanding that previous immersion in the social 
world teaches one how to make sense of the current 
moment. 
 
What is common to Husserl and Jaspers is immersing 
oneself in the descriptions of the experiences of 
others, in order to grasp something like what their 
first-hand experience might be (Husserl, 1973, cited 
in Marbach, 1982, pp. 466-467). Jaspers also urged 
psychiatrists to focus on the conscious experiences of 
their clients (1913/1963, p. 27), stating that the means 
of doing so is “the empathic listening to others in 
which we simultaneously keep touch with ourselves” 
(p. 21). He further insisted that “we shall keep the 
expression ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) solely for the 
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understanding of psychic events ‘from within’. The 
expression will never be used for the appreciation of 
objective causal connections, which we have said can 
only be seen ‘from without’” (p. 28). Perceptual 
presence indicates what is real here and now. It has to 
be noted that what is psychological is not perceptual – 
real here and now – in the sense that it is directly 
observable by anyone else. But it is interpretable, due 
to social learning. The type of reality of the 
psychological object is intentional and shared 
between people. It is a mixture of the past and future 
in the present. It is the result of past learning and can 
be open to re-learning. 
 
The commonality between Husserl and Jaspers lies in 
the themes of intentionality, empathy, and the desire 
to attend to what other people experience, in the 
particular and in theory-making. Any conclusions 
about others require the conscious evidence of what 
they experience. This general principle is called 
“fulfilment”, as previously noted. In this case, it is a 
quasi-experiencing through psychological under-
standing, entirely obtained through imagination and 
empathy about other persons, in relation to one’s own 
life experiences and the basic ability to imagine what 
life is like for others, even though they might be 
radically different to oneself. It is important to 
conclude from experiential evidence of one’s own 
intentionalities, as others turn towards the same or 
similar cultural objects. Husserl and Jaspers agree that 
formal psychological concepts can only be derived 
from such understanding. Formal psychological 
concepts can only be derived from such 
understanding. Husserl’s term for this was “authentic” 
empathy and this is synonymous with adopting a 
“personalistic attitude” towards others. He was clear 





Although the biopsychosocial approach is laudable, it 
remains to be seen precisely how nature and nurture 
can be made into a unified whole, given that the two 
disciplines come from radically different ontological 
bases. There is a major tension between a focus on the 
biological basis for behaviour as opposed to the open 
exploration of meaningful qualitative experiences. 
Hermeneutic phenomenology concerns itself with the 
fundamentals for a qualitative approach to theory and 
practice. Its strength is that it is ready to account for 
variability in the senses of the same object. It can 
work with complex experiences because its holism 
can identify the contributory parts of experience as 
intentionality, sense, object and context. What 
phenomenology shows is that some phenomena are 
invisible to the natural science approach and fall 
outside of its remit. 
 
In working towards a concordant biopsychosocial 
view, a hermeneutic applied psychology could 
support the understanding of human being as 
comprised of biological, psychological and social 
aspects, in which a great many contexts of parts and 
wholes could be identified (Kern, 1986). The type of 
causality at play for human beings is multi-factorial, 
comprising both nature and nurture. Natural cause is 
irreversible biological cause in genetic tendencies to 
have a specific sort of personality and specific sorts of 
psychological problem (Livesley, 2003, pp. 69-73). 
Psychological problems may also arise as a 
consequence of material damage to the brain or the 
physical structure of the body and its physiological 
ability to deal with stress, for instance. In the world of 
nurture, there are the meaningful events of smaller 
and wider spheres. Thus there is the world of personal 
choice and action, the world of the family of 
attachment figures within the cultural world of 
persons who are known, within the wider worlds of 
persons who may not be known but who are still 
influential. And, finally, there is the widest world 
possible of society and international influences on the 
individual life and history. It is a future project to 
unite the more meaning-oriented and empirical 
phenomenological approaches to the more natural 
scientific ones. 
 
Even now only a small proportion of the original 
writings of Edmund Husserl are available to the 
public, and their translation into English has delayed 
the grasping of their full intent and perspective. The 
mature worldview of Husserl would now be called 
“social construction”, but Husserl himself created the 
term “generative phenomenology” to refer to the 
accrual of meaning across the development of human 
civilisation (Steinbock, 1995). Husserl took a holistic 
view of the development of the lifeworld. He focused 
on social history as the scope for the creation and 
maintenance of meaning. In overview: cultural worlds 
create themselves across history. This means that co-
construction occurs through people who know each 
other face to face, and it obeys identifiable laws, 
societal preferences and traditions of various sorts. 
The term “world” in phenomenology means a world-
horizon that contains within it a set of persons with 
their meaningful cultural objects of various kinds, 
such as music, food, ideas, social roles, and emotional 
responses with respect to the excitements and 
disappointments found there. Poetry, drama and film 
depict the worldviews of others in ways comparable 
to listening to someone speak about his or her life. 
Not much needs to be said before empathy fills in the 
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gaps and makes sense of what is auditorially 
presented to consciousness. 
 
However, what intentionality means is that concepts 
and experiences refer to the work done by 
consciousness in making meaning. It is a major task 
of Husserl’s phenomenology to grasp this ability. A 
large portion of psychological life concerns 
psychological understanding about the intentions and 
feelings of others. But the region of natural cause 
does not properly appear in human behaviour and 
experience and is hard to identify. Contrary to 
Husserl, when hermeneutics is accepted there are no 
absolute starting points, no privileged starting points, 
and no possibility of self-validation by appeal to some 
best evidence outside of the hermeneutic circle. For 
the mature Husserl, “History is the great fact of 
absolute Being; and the ultimate questions, the 
ultimate metaphysical and teleological questions, are 
one with the questions regarding the absolute 
meaning of history” (1956, p. 506, cited in Bernet, 
Kern & Marbach, 1993, p. 265). Consequently, the 
totality of cultural objects signifies human nature and 
its consciousness. The works produced indicate the 
intentions and nature of their makers. 
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This paper has argued that the tradition of 
phenomenology centres on interpreting lived 
experiences in various ways. The original Husserlian 
project is the mental clarification of the 
intentionalities in relation to their objects in 
preparation for new empirical psychological and 
sociological approaches that would meet their objects 
properly. But to ignore the ways that previous 
understanding creates influences will not make them 
go away. On the contrary, when it is accepted that the 
expectations of the future in the present are formed on 
the basis of the influence of the past – then one's own 
bias can begin to be grasped. In order to distinguish 
one’s own conclusions, it is necessary to ensure that 
they concern the current topic and not past ones. To 
have clarity about one’s own stance should minimise 
the confusion of mistaking one’s own perspective for 
the one and only reading of a situation. Thus 
hermeneutics is part of reasoning about various 
realms of evidence. 
 
Academics and the general population have widely 
differing understandings about human nature and 
what motivates human action. Despite what is 
ordinarily passed on as “folk psychology”, 
understanding human situations accurately is 
demanded by life itself. Inevitably, the complex 
totality of human being exceeds the attempt to grasp it 
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